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Others Who Oppose One’s Worldviews?
Arnaud Wisman and Sander L. Koole
Free University Amsterdam
The present research highlights affiliation defenses in the psychological confrontation with death. In 3
experiments, it was found that mortality salience led to increased affiliation strivings, as indicated by a
greater preference for sitting within a group as opposed to sitting alone. Mortality salience actually led
to increased affiliation with a worldview-threatening group (Experiments 1–2), even when affiliation
with the group forced participants to attack their own worldviews (Experiment 3). Taken together, the
findings support a distinct role of affiliation defenses against existential concerns. Moreover, affiliation
defenses seem powerful enough to override worldview validation defenses, even when the worldviews
in question are personally relevant and highly accessible.
At the beginning of World War II, all Dutch university profes-
sors were faced with a terrifying decision (Moore, 1997). The Nazi
occupiers of the Netherlands had decreed that all Dutch public
servants must provide a so-called Aryan attestation, a written
declaration of their affiliation with the Aryan race. By effectively
asking Jewish civil servants to identify themselves, this declaration
facilitated the exclusion of the Jews from education, public office,
and the economy. Even though the Netherlands enjoyed a long-
standing tradition of tolerance toward ethnic groups (Schama,
1997) and most Dutch academics were condemning of anti-
Semitism, the Aryan attestation inspired only a few limited pro-
tests. Indeed, nearly all the teachers and academics did eventually
sign the declarations. Historians nowadays agree that the lack of
Dutch resistance to this policy was one of the key factors in the
efficiency of the Nazi persecution of the Jews in the Netherlands,
which culminated in the extermination of 102,000 out of a total of
142,000 Dutch Jews (Moore, 1997).
This dark and disturbing episode in the history of the Nether-
lands gives rise to some profound questions regarding human
nature. Why do so many people seem willing to forsake their
personal convictions when their own existence is threatened? One
possibility is that most people are moral hypocrites (Batson,
Kobrynowicz, Dinnerstein, Kampf, & Wilson, 1997) who pay no
more than lip service to their ideological beliefs. As soon as their
own life is on the line, people might begin to weigh their options
extra carefully and logically decide that their beliefs are not really
worth dying for. Although we do not deny that rational thinking
may be one important form of dealing with existential concerns
(see Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 1999), the present re-
search deals with a decidedly more irrational—but, we believe, no
less common—response to the psychological encounter with
death. Specifically, we suggest that people’s concerns with their
own vulnerability and mortality may arouse a deeply rooted,
largely unconscious desire to avoid being isolated from others. As
a result, the psychological confrontation with death may lead a
person to side with the nearest social group—much like the Dutch
professors did during World War II—even when this group ad-
vocates values that are contrary to that person’s ideological beliefs.
In the remainder of this article, we further examine the influence
of existential concerns on affiliation with groups that either uphold
or oppose one’s ideological beliefs. We begin by discussing terror
management theory (TMT; e.g., Greenberg, Solomon, & Pyszc-
zynski, 1997), an influential theoretical perspective that argues that
people’s concerns with death may exert a powerful effect on their
ideological allegiances and interpersonal affiliations. However,
because TMT has considered ideological validation as primary to
affiliation needs, the perspective is hard pressed to explain why
people might choose to affiliate with a group that contradicts their
ideology. Accordingly, to deepen our understanding of this issue,
we turn to recent research on interpersonal affiliation and attach-
ment processes, which has argued for a distinct anxiety-buffering
value of affiliation (e.g., Mikulincer & Florian, 2000; Taylor et al.,
2000). In previous discussions, terror management motives and
affiliation needs have been put forward as mutually exclusive
accounts of social motivation (e.g., Greenberg, Pyszczynski, &
Solomon, 1990; Leary & Baumeister, 2000; Muraven & Baumeis-
ter, 1997). However, we suggest that it is possible for both theo-
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retical perspectives to be valid, to the extent that terror manage-
ment needs may fuel the drive to affiliate with others (see
Mikulincer & Florian, in press, for a broad overview). After
discussing these ideas, we present three experiments that were
designed to test our theoretical analysis.
Terror Management Function of Cultural Worldviews
TMT has provided a groundbreaking analysis of how people’s
need to manage the fear of death becomes translated into social
behavior (Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 1991; Greenberg
et al., 1997; Pyszczynski et al., 1999). On the basis of the writings
of existential thinkers such as Kierkegaard, Rank, and Becker,
TMT argues that death anxiety arises from the juxtaposition of an
instinctual drive for self-preservation and the advanced intellectual
ability to reflect on one’s vulnerabilities and the inevitability of
death. As such, death anxiety is seen as an inescapable aspect of
the human condition, a form of anxiety that can only be controlled
through a variety of social–symbolic defenses. Specifically, TMT
posits that death anxiety is managed through a dual-component
cultural anxiety buffer consisting of (a) a system of socially shared
values or cultural worldviews, which imbue life with structure,
meaning, and a promise to attain either literally or symbolic
immortality for those who live up to the prescribed cultural stan-
dards and values, and (b) self-esteem, which is acquired by the
belief to suffice the standards and values that are prescribed by
one’s cultural worldviews (Greenberg et al., 1997; Pyszczynski et
al., 1999). We restrict our discussion to the worldview component
of TMT, because this aspect of the theory is most relevant in the
present context (for a more complete discussion of TMT, see
Greenberg et al., 1997).
According to TMT, a cultural worldview is “a shared conception
of reality that imbues life with meaning, order, and permanence
and the promise of safety and death transcendence to those who
meet the prescribed standards of value” (Greenberg et al., 1997, p.
71). Thus, the anxiety-buffering function of cultural worldviews
operates at the level of socially shared symbols: Cultural world-
views offer the hope of achieving symbolic immortality, which
then serves to control the terror that is aroused by the symbolic
(i.e., psychological) confrontation with death. This presumed ter-
ror management function of cultural worldviews has been empir-
ically tested in a systematic program of research. Most of this
research has used the so-called mortality salience paradigm, in
which mortality salience is manipulated (usually through two
open-ended questions about death or a neutral topic), after which
participants’ defense of their cultural worldviews is assessed. The
rationale behind this research is that if cultural worldviews func-
tion as a psychological shield against death concerns, evoking
these concerns should increase the need to defend those world-
views. In line with TMT, research using the mortality salience
paradigm has found that worldview defense increases under
heightened mortality salience. For instance, mortality salience has
been found to promote exaggerated consensus estimates for per-
sonally held opinions (Pyszczynski et al., 1996; Simon, Greenberg,
Arndt, et al., 1997), reliance on cultural stereotypes (Schimel et al.,
1999), and reluctance to desecrate culturally cherished icons
(Greenberg, Simon, Porteus, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1995).
It is notable that most of the research that has been guided by
TMT has operationalized worldview defense rather indirectly, by
examining people’s evaluations of others who either uphold or
attack their cultural worldviews. From a terror management per-
spective, relationships with other people are primarily valued
because they furnish a means of validating one’s worldviews. In
line with this, a number of experiments have shown that reminding
people of their own mortality leads to more positive evaluations of
others who praise or share their cultural worldviews (e.g., Green-
berg, Pyszczynski, Solomon, et al., 1990; see Greenberg et al.,
1997). Conversely, TMT predicts that people who fail to provide
validation of one’s worldviews will be much less valued or even
derogated. Consistent with this, a number of experiments have
shown that mortality salience leads to harsher judgments against
individuals who violate people’s moral principles or who attack
their cultural worldviews (e.g., Arndt & Greenberg, 1999; Florian
& Mikulincer, 1997; Rosenblatt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczyn-
ski, & Lyon, 1989). Moreover, a recent set of studies has extended
these findings to actual behavior by showing that mortality sa-
lience can promote aggression toward others who have threatened
one’s worldviews (H. McGregor et al., 1998).
Taken together, TMT research has yielded evidence that inter-
personal evaluations are a direct function of the extent to which
others serve as appropriate vehicles for worldview validation. As
such, this line of research seems to leave no room for a separate
anxiety-reducing role of interpersonal affiliation. After all, if af-
filiation in itself was sufficient to combat death anxiety, one might
expect that attitudes toward others would remain at least somewhat
positive even when these others were perceived as threatening to
one’s cultural worldviews. However, it is important to note that
prior TMT research was not explicitly aimed at pitting the anxiety-
buffering role of affiliation against that of worldview validation.
As a result, many of the obtained findings might still allow for an
anxiety-reducing role of interpersonal affiliation. For instance, in
the majority of this research, the targets who attacked participants’
worldviews were out-group members (e.g., Arndt, Greenberg,
Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1997; Greenberg, Pyszczynski,
Solomon, Simon, & Breus, 1994; Greenberg, Simon, Pyszczynski,
Solomon, & Chatel, 1992; Simon, Greenberg, Harmon-Jones, et
al., 1997). Other evidence for ideological distancing under height-
ened mortality salience has been obtained in the context of distal,
vaguely defined groups (e.g., the general population; Simon,
Greenberg, Arndt, et al., 1997). Because both out-groups and distal
groups are unlikely to be regarded as potential relationship part-
ners, distancing oneself from the members of such groups is less
likely to invoke feelings of social isolation (Baumeister & Leary,
1995). Consequently, finding that mortality salience promotes
distancing from out-group members or distal groups does not rule
out the possibility that affiliation with in-group members or mem-
bers of proximal groups may assist in coping with existential
threat.
Terror Management Function of Affiliation
In recent years, a number of researchers have begun to pay more
explicit attention to the potential terror management functions of
interpersonal affiliation. It is notable that some of this work has
evolved directly from TMT research. For instance, Harmon-Jones,
Greenberg, Solomon, and Simon (1996; see Castano, Yzerbyt,
Paladino, & Sacchi, 2002, for a conceptual replication) explored
the influence of mortality salience in a minimal group setting. In
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keeping with the classic minimal group paradigm (Tajfel, Billig,
Bundy, & Flament, 1971), participants were assigned to ad hoc,
artificial groups that were formed on the basis of a criterion that
was clearly arbitrary (i.e., preference for a certain type of paint-
ing). After this, participants were asked to ascribe positive and
negative traits to the in-group and out-group. The results showed
that mortality salience led participants to be more biased toward
their own minimal group. Given that the basis for group member-
ship was deliberately designed to be arbitrary in this context, it
seems hard to argue that belonging to such a group constituted an
important aspect of participants’ cultural worldviews (though see
Dechesne, Greenberg, Arndt, & Schimel, 2000; Dechesne, Jans-
sen, van Knippenberg, 2000; Harmon-Jones et al., 1996, for an
alternative interpretation). In a related vein, Arndt, Greenberg,
Solomon, Pyszczynski, and Schimel (1999) found that mortality-
salient participants who had engaged in a creativity task expressed
higher levels of social projection, an index of perceived social
connectedness. On the basis of these findings, Arndt et al. (1999)
suggested that “maintaining a sense of social connection serves the
vital function of protecting individuals from concerns associated
with mortality” (p. 21). As such, recent TMT research has begun
to uncover some initial evidence for a terror management function
of affiliation.
Another relevant line of research has focused on the role of
attachment style in coping with existential concerns. One early
study showed that chronic attachment style is an important mod-
erator of the personal fear of death, with securely attached indi-
viduals displaying lower fear of death than do insecurely attached
individuals (Mikulincer, Florian, & Tolmacz, 1990). Following up
on this work, Florian, Mikulincer and associates (Florian & Miku-
lincer, 1998; Florian, Mikulincer, & Hirschberger, 2001; Miku-
lincer & Florian, 2000; Mikulincer & Florian, in press; Taubman
Ben-Ari, Findler, & Mikulincer, 2002) have demonstrated that
chronic attachment style moderates symbolic terror management
defenses. For instance, Florian and Mikulincer (1998) found that
securely attached individuals reported a higher sense of continuity
and lastingness, as assessed through the concept of symbolic
immortality (Lifton, 1983). In another series of studies, only inse-
curely attached individuals were found to respond to mortality
salience by increased worldview defense (Mikulincer & Florian,
2000). By contrast, securely attached individuals were found to
respond to mortality salience by increasing their desire for inti-
macy. Finally, Taubman Ben-Ari et al. (2002) reported that mor-
tality salience led to more willingness to initiate social interactions,
especially among securely attached individuals.
On the basis of these accumulating findings, Florian, Mikulincer
and associates (see Mikulincer & Florian, in press, for a broad
overview) have recently proposed that interpersonal affiliation
may form an anxiety buffer that is functionally distinct from
worldview defense. According to this argument, the condition of
being affiliated with others creates a “haven of safety” (Miku-
lincer, Birnbaum, Woddis, & Nachmias, 2000, p. 509) in which
people can feel secure, even in times of severe distress (see also
Bowlby, 1969, 1973). It is important to note that affiliation is
assumed to be mediated by different psychological mechanisms
than is worldview defense. Whereas worldview defense is presum-
ably mediated by cultural–symbolic processes, the buffering func-
tion of affiliation may be mediated to a considerable degree by
automatic, subcognitive, biologically based mechanisms. From an
evolutionary perspective, affiliation confers many important ad-
vantages on the individual, such as improved ability to gather food,
increased likelihood of mating, and greater protection against
threats in the environment (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Buss,
1991; Sedikides & Skowronski, 1997). Given the important adap-
tive benefits associated with affiliation, it seems plausible that
some powerful psychological mechanisms have evolved to ensure
that individuals maximize the association between themselves and
their social group and minimize the danger of becoming isolated or
expelled from the group (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Mikulincer et
al., 2000; Taylor et al., 2000). The anxiety-reducing function of
affiliation might represent one of these mechanisms by leading
individuals to seek out the company of others under threatening
circumstances.
Recent psychobiological work seems to fit with a direct, sub-
cognitive, anxiety-reducing impact of affiliation. Along these
lines, animal research has found that affiliation behaviors in mam-
mals result in notable changes in neuroendocrine responding. For
instance, one study of squirrel monkeys showed that increased
cortisol levels after mother–infant separation became reduced
when mother and infant were reunited (Coe, Mendoza, Smother-
man, & Levine, 1978). Other studies have found that infant rats
that grow up with highly nurturing mothers show better regulation
of somatic growth and neural development (Francis, Diorio, Liu, &
Meaney, 1999). Analogous findings have been obtained in hu-
mans, for whom important hormonal and neurophysiological sub-
strates of caregiving and attachment have been identified (Carter,
Lederhendler, & Kirkpatrick, 1997; Reis, Collins, & Berscheid,
2000; Siegel, 1999; Uchino, Cacioppo, & Kiecolt-Glaser, 1996).
This line of research indicates that the mere presence of another
individual may have direct emotional and neuroendocrinal buffer-
ing effects that operate independently of cognitive appraisal
(House, Landis, & Umberson, 1988). For instance, securely at-
tached individuals display lower levels of stress hormones than do
insecurely attached individuals in challenging circumstances
(Nachmias, Gunnar, Mangelsdorf, Parritz, & Buss, 1996). In a
related vein, recent neuroendocrine evidence has implicated an
oxytocin-based system as a biobehavioral mechanism that under-
lies the tend-and-befriend pattern in response to stress (especially
among women, see Taylor et al., 2000). Taken together, these lines
of research are consistent with the operation of a set of biologically
based, subcognitive mediators in the distress-regulating influence
of affiliation. The subcognitive mediation of affiliation may be
contrasted with worldview validation defenses, which are presum-
ably mediated by higher brain functions that can support
cognitive–symbolic processes (Pyszczynski et al., 1999). There-
fore, converging evidence points to an anxiety-buffering role of
affiliation that is functionally distinct from the cognitive–symbolic
worldview defense mechanisms that have been explored by TMT
researchers.
The Present Research and Hypotheses
In the preceding paragraphs, worldview validation and affilia-
tion were proposed as two rather different ways people may
protect themselves against existential threat. We presume that
worldview validation operates at the level of socially shared sym-
bols and controls death anxiety by offering the promise of sym-
bolic immortality and death transcendence. By contrast, the
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anxiety-buffering function of affiliation may operate predomi-
nantly on a subsymbolic level, through affective–behavioral
mechanisms that unfold in close interaction with automatic neu-
rophysiological processes. Although worldview validation and af-
filiation thus appear to be distinct terror management defenses,
very little work has explicitly examined both kinds of defenses
simultaneously (but see Mikulincer & Florian, 2000, for a recent
individual-differences approach to this topic). Moreover, we are
not aware of any research that has directly examined the relative
strength of these defenses—for instance, by pitting them against
each other within a single experimental design. The present re-
search was conducted to address these issues.
In the following series of experiments, we use the mortality
salience paradigm to examine the influence of existential concerns
on affiliation behavior. In each experiment, we manipulated mor-
tality salience and subsequently examined participants’ tendency
to affiliate with a proximal social group. In Experiments 1 and 2,
the beliefs that were espoused by this group were experimentally
varied, to be either in line or in conflict with participants’ cultural
worldviews. For the in-group that supported participants’ world-
views, both TMT and affiliation theory predict that mortality
salience leads to enhanced affiliation with the group. After all,
affiliating with a worldview-validating in-group presumably
serves to fulfill both participants’ needs for worldview validation
and their affiliation needs. By contrast, worldview validation and
affiliation needs are in conflict when the in-group propagates
beliefs or values that are contrary to participants’ cultural world-
views. In Experiment 3, we presented participants even more
directly with this conflict by explicitly asking them to choose
between sitting alone and defending their own worldviews or
sitting in the group and attacking their own worldviews.
On the basis of prior TMT research, one might expect the need
for worldview validation to prevail and might thus predict that
mortality salience should lead to decreased affiliation in situations
in which affiliation represents a threat to worldview validation.
However, as noted before, this line of research has primarily
examined reactions toward out-group members or distal groups
and may thus have allowed little room for the emergence of
affiliation defenses. From the perspective of affiliation theory,
affiliation defenses are most likely to become activated when
people are interacting with concrete members of the in-group.
Hence, given that the present research was conducted in an in-
group setting, we anticipated that affiliation defenses would be
more influential in the present context than in previous TMT
research. Accordingly, mortality salience might enhance partici-
pants’ tendency to affiliate with their own social group, even when
affiliating with the group was threatening to participants’ cultural
worldviews.
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 examines affiliation defenses in a context in
which the nearest social group consisted of a concrete, rather
accidental collection of individuals. Specifically, participants were
first reminded of death and were then offered an opportunity to
affiliate with a group of research participants with whom they
would supposedly engage in a group discussion. Because these
other participants did not form a very meaningful social category,
it seemed unlikely that affiliation with such a haphazard collection
of individuals would provide a strong boost to participants’ cul-
tural worldviews. By contrast, even a social environment com-
pletely devoid of cultural symbolism might still be suitable for the
operation of affiliation defenses, given that affiliation defenses are
presumably mediated by subsymbolic mechanisms (Baumeister &
Leary, 1995; Kuhl, 2001; Taubman Ben-Ari et al., 2002). Accord-
ingly, we assessed our participants’ affiliation defenses by adapt-
ing the so-called seating paradigm, a classic methodology within
the social–psychological literature (e.g., Macrae, Bodenhausen,
Milne, & Jetten, 1994; Pleban & Tesser, 1981; Schachter, 1959;
Tice, 1992). By and large, this literature indicates that individuals
tend to maintain a closer seating distance from others with whom
they would like to affiliate. As such, the seating paradigm provides
us with a subtle, well-validated behavioral measure of affiliation.
More specifically, we arranged for a room in which participants
could either sit down alone (i.e., on a single chair) or among the
other participants (i.e., on one of three chairs that were arranged in
a cluster), and we surreptitiously observed where the participants
chose to sit. Assuming that mortality salience would arouse par-
ticipants’ affiliation defenses, we could expect to find a more
pronounced preference for sitting down in the group over sitting
down alone under heightened mortality salience.
Experiment 1’s main theoretical focus was the interplay be-
tween affiliation and worldview validation defenses. We created a
conflict between the two kinds of defenses by manipulating
whether participants’ fellow group members supported versus at-
tacked their cultural worldviews. Specifically, participants were
told either that the personality dispositions of their group discus-
sants were very tolerant or that the discussants’ dispositions were
not very tolerant at all. Because tolerance is one of the most
revered values in the culture of the Netherlands (e.g., Schama,
1997), we expected that this manipulation would significantly alter
participants’ perceptions of the degree to which their fellow dis-
cussants supported their cultural worldviews. Accordingly, from a
TMT perspective, the effects of mortality salience on affiliation
behavior should be moderated by the ideological stance that was
taken by participants’ fellow group members: Mortality salience
should promote affiliation when group members were described as
having tolerant worldviews but not when group members were
described as having intolerant worldviews. On the other hand, an
affiliation perspective might predict only a main effect of mortality
salience on affiliation behavior, given that the entire social inter-
action took place within an in-group context.
After participants were seated, we collected some conventional
paper-and-pencil measures of worldview defense. Specifically, we
provided the participants with two essays, one that criticized, and
another that praised Dutch cultural values. Worldview defense was
operationalized as a pro-Dutch bias in participants’ evaluations of
the authors of the essays. We chose to focus on author evaluations
because past research suggests that this measure is a particularly
sensitive measure of worldview defense (Simon, Greenberg, Har-
mon Jones, et al., 1997). In a rather exploratory vein, our analyses
of this worldview defense measure also included participants’
seating position (i.e., alone or in the group). Theoretically, world-
view defense might be especially pronounced among participants
who chose to sit alone, as these participants’ behavior would seem
to imply that their reliance on affiliation defenses was weaker (see
Mikulincer & Florian, 2000). Alternatively, mortality salience
might evoke such a powerful need for worldview validation that
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participants’ affiliation status (i.e., their seating position) would
not moderate the emergence of worldview validation defenses.
Method
Participants and design. Seventy-nine undergraduate students from
the University of Nijmegen (53 women and 26 men,1 average age  22)
were randomly assigned to a 2 (mortality salience: high vs. low)  2
(tolerance of the in-group: high vs. low) between-subjects factorial design.
Participants received Dfl. 5 (about $2) for their participation.
Procedure and materials. On arriving at the laboratory, participants
were welcomed and escorted to small cubicles, each containing an Apple
Macintosh computer. The experimenter (who was unaware of the experi-
mental conditions) explained that a short group discussion was to be part
of the current investigation and pointed out the room where this discussion
was to take place. All the remaining instructions were administered through
the computer screen. Participants were first informed that they would fill
out some personality questionnaires during the first part of the investiga-
tion. On the basis of these questionnaires, the computer calculated which
scores were applicable to the participants themselves and the other partic-
ipants who were to take part in the group discussion. It was explained that
during the second part of the investigation, participants would read and
give their opinions of two essays, followed by a group discussion about the
essays. In reality, this group discussion did not take place; indeed, the
experiment was run for each participant individually. After the most
important measures were collected, participants were informed that the
group discussion was cancelled.
The next part of the experiment was described as a study of personality
and consisted of a few filler questionnaires that were followed by the
mortality salience or control manipulation. This manipulation was closely
patterned after previous TMT research (e.g., Greenberg, Pyszczynski,
Solomon, et al., 1990; Rosenblatt et al., 1989). Specifically, participants in
the mortality salience condition were asked to respond to the following two
open-ended questions: (a) “Describe the emotions you feel while you are
thinking about your own death,” and (b) “Describe what you think will
happen to you when you physically die.” Control participants responded to
two parallel questions in which the words own death were substituted by
the words watching television. Immediately following the mortality sa-
lience treatment, participants rated their current feelings on the 20-item
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Telle-
gen, 1988). Both subscales of PANAS were scored on 5-point scales (1 
not at all, 5  very much).
Next, participants were informed that both their own and the other
discussion group members’ personality scores had become available. Par-
ticipants were told that it was important for them to remember these scores
in light of the upcoming group discussion. The personality scores then
appeared on the computer screen. Participants in the tolerant group con-
dition read, “Zero out of four participants had a low score on the tolerance
scale.” Participants in the intolerant group condition read, “Three out of
four participants had a low score on the tolerance scale.” Note that the
intolerant feedback still allowed room for the participants to consider
themselves as having a tolerant personality. After receiving the feedback,
participants were instructed to take with them a closed envelope placed
next to the computer and walk to the adjoining discussion room. The
experimental sessions were scheduled so that each participant did not meet
other participants in the discussion room. The discussion room was fur-
nished with a rectangular table and five chairs (see Figure 1). On the far
end of the table, there stood one big-armed chair (presumably, this chair
would be occupied by the group interviewer). On one long side of the table,
three chairs were placed next to each other; on the other long side of the
table, there stood only one chair. As soon as participants had taken their
seats, the experimenter unobtrusively recorded participants’ seating posi-
tion (1  the single chair, 2  one of the three clustered chairs).
While they were waiting for the other discussants, participants were
asked to complete a packet of questionnaires that was in the envelope they
had brought with them. These questionnaires consisted of a paper-and-
pencil measure of worldview defense that was modeled after Greenberg et
al. (1992). Specifically, participants read two essays, which had been
supposedly written by foreign students staying in the Netherlands. One of
the essays delivered criticism, whereas the other essay delivered praise to
Dutch culture. The anti-Dutch essay criticized Dutch tolerance for drugs,
sex, and violence and the Dutch authorities’ soft attitudes toward ethnic
minorities. The essay concluded by stating, “I am glad that I will leave this
country again because I don’t think that it’s possible for anyone to become
happy around here.” The pro-Dutch essay was similar in length but
conveyed a highly favorable attitude toward living in the Netherlands.
Although the latter essay granted that—like any other country in the
world—the Netherlands has a few negative sides, it lavishly praised the
freedom, education, and welfare system that characterize the Netherlands.
The essay concluded, “We should be proud of the fact that people in The
Netherlands live in a very democratic and tolerant country.”
Each essay was followed by two questionnaires that assessed partici-
pants’ evaluations of the authors of the essays. The first questionnaire was
modeled after the Interpersonal Judgement Scale (IJS; Byrne, 1971; see
1 Repeating all the analyses in the present research with gender as a
covariate did not alter any of the results. This may be due to the small
number of male participants or to the rather robust affiliation effects after
mortality salience that occurred for both male and female participants.
Thus, although past research has suggested that gender may moderate
affiliation defenses concerns (Arndt, Greenberg, & Cook, 2002; Taylor et
al., 2000), the potentially moderating role of gender was not confirmed in
the present research.
Figure 1. Schematic representation of the discussion room (Experi-
ments 1 and 2). The chairs on which the participants could sit down were
placed either to the left or to the right of the table (the rectangle in the
figure). The placing of the clustered chairs and the single chairs was
counterbalanced across conditions. The interviewer’s chair was placed at
the far end of the table.
515HIDING IN THE CROWD
Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Solomon, et al., 1990) and asked participants to
provide general evaluations of each author. Representative items are “To
what extent do you think this person is prejudiced?” and “Would you like
to meet this person?” The second questionnaire requested participants to
rate the extent to which a series of traits applied to the author of each essay.
The items of the second questionnaire were translated from Greenberg,
Pyszczynski, Solomon, et al. (1990) and consisted of 15 positive traits
and 15 negative traits presented in a random order. All the items were rated
on a 9-point scale (1  not at all, to 9  very much). As soon as
participants had completed the worldview defense measure, the experi-
menter entered the discussion room and informed them that the group
discussion had been cancelled. Finally, participants were probed for sus-
picion, debriefed, paid, and dismissed.
Results
Manipulation checks. Almost all of the participants (96.2%)
were able to recall the personality feedback regarding the tolerance
of the discussion group. The 3 participants (3.8%) who had diffi-
culty remembering the personality feedback were excluded from
the analyses reported below. Four additional participants (5.1%)
accidentally ran into each other when they went into the discussion
room. These participants were also excluded from the analyses.2
Self-reported affect. A 2 (mortality salience: high vs. low) 2
(group tolerance: high vs. low) multivariate analysis of variance
(MANOVA) was conducted on the subscales of the PANAS. No
reliable effects emerged.
Seating position. Participants’ seating positions were sub-
jected to a 2 (mortality salience: high vs. low)  2 (group toler-
ance: high vs. low) 2 (seating position: single chair vs. clustered
chair) logistic regression analysis. This analysis revealed a signif-
icant Seating Position Mortality Salience interaction, 2(1, N 
72)  10.76, p  .005. As shown in Table 1, a large majority of
the participants (80.0%, n  28) in the high mortality salience
condition chose to sit in one of the clustered chairs. In contrast,
less than half of the participants (46.0%, n  17) in the low
mortality salience condition preferred to sit in a clustered chair. No
effects were found for group tolerance or for the interaction
between group tolerance and mortality salience (both ps  .2).
Worldview defense. We only report the results for the IJS,
because these were highly similar to the results obtained for the
trait rating measure. A component factor analysis showed that the
five items of the IJS loaded .60 or higher on a single factor. After
recoding reverse-scored items, we summed and averaged the
items. We then constructed a composite measure by subtracting
participants’ mean evaluations of the anti-Dutch author from their
mean evaluations of the pro-Dutch author, such that higher means
indicated a stronger pro-Dutch bias.
Because we anticipated that participants’ seating position might
have influenced their tendency to engage in worldview defense, we
included seating position in the analysis as an independent vari-
able. It should be noted that seating position was not a manipulated
but a measured variable, so that any effects involving seating
position should be interpreted with great caution. We proceeded by
analyzing the worldview defense measure in a 2 (mortality sa-
lience: high vs. low)  2 (group tolerance: high vs. low)  2
(seating position: single chair vs. clustered chair) between-subjects
analysis of variance (ANOVA). This analysis revealed a signifi-
cant Mortality Salience  Seating Position interaction effect, F(1,
64)  5.25, p  .025 (d  0.76). As can be seen in Table 2, the
classic worldview defense pattern of greater pro-Dutch bias under
high versus low mortality salience was obtained among the group
that had chosen to sit in the single chair (M  2.00, SD  1.85 vs.
M  0.86, SD  1.46). By contrast, the clustered chair group
showed a trend in the opposite direction, with less pro-Dutch bias
occurring under high mortality salience than under low mortality
salience (M  1.10, SD  1.92 vs. M  2.22, SD  1.71). Thus,
although separate analyses revealed no significant effects, there
was some indication that the emergence of ideological defenses
was systematically related to participants’ seating position.
Discussion
Consistent with recent reports in the literature (Arndt et al.,
1999; Harmon-Jones et al., 1996; Mikulincer & Florian, 2000),
Experiment 1 finds evidence for a terror management function of
in-group affiliation. Specifically, the results show that mortality
salience led to increased affiliation strivings, as indicated by a
greater preference to sit in the group as opposed to sitting alone.
Moreover, this form of affiliation defense was not qualified by
whether the group members supported participants’ cultural
worldviews.
Experiment 1 yields suggestive evidence that at least some
participants engaged in worldview defense. That is, the essay
measure of worldview defense reveals that mortality salience led
to increased worldview defense among participants who had cho-
sen to sit alone but not among participants who had chosen to sit
down in the group. Because this finding is correlational, its inter-
pretation is somewhat ambiguous. One possibility is that affiliation
and worldview validation defenses can psychologically compen-
sate for each other (see Koole, Smeets, Van Knippenberg, &
Dijksterhuis, 1999; Tesser, 2001). This notion is compatible with
recent research by Mikulincer and Florian (2000), who found that
worldview validation defenses are less prevalent among securely
attached individuals. It could be, then, that affiliation defenses
possess substitution value for worldview validation defenses, such
that participants who had engaged in one kind of defense no longer
needed to engage in the other kind of defense.
However, another possibility is that our seating position mea-
sure was confounded with personal importance of tolerance. Spe-
2 In all three experiments reported in this article, the pattern of findings
remained essentially unchanged when participants who were excluded on
the basis of procedural errors or misunderstandings were included in the
analyses.
Table 1
Seating Preference as a Function of Mortality Salience
(Experiment 1)
Mortality salience
Preferred seat
Single chair Clustered chair
n % n %
Low 20 54 17 46
High 7 20 28 80
Note. N  72.
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cifically, participants who had chosen to sit down among a group
of intolerant discussants might have done so because they had not
fully internalized the Dutch cultural value of tolerance. By this
reasoning, tolerance may have mattered only for participants who
had chosen to distance themselves from the intolerant group, so
that only these individuals could use tolerance as a terror manage-
ment defense. From a sociocultural perspective, this would be
remarkable, given the widespread consensus among social scien-
tists that tolerance represents one of the core values in Dutch
society (e.g., Moore, 1997; Schama, 1997). Moreover, some earlier
research suggests a general tendency among our sample to rely on
tolerance as a terror management defense (Koole & Dechesne,
2000). Nevertheless, prior TMT research has pointed to the exis-
tence of substantive individual differences in the importance that
people place on tolerance (Greenberg et al., 1992). Even though
the latter research was conducted in the United States, it cannot be
ruled out that similar individual differences were influential in our
sample of Dutch university students.
It is notable that, in the tolerant group condition, seating position
was presumably unable to differentiate between individuals for
whom tolerance was important and those for whom tolerance was
unimportant. Consequently, the lack of an interaction among mor-
tality salience, seating position, and group tolerance seems to
argue against an individual-differences account. Then again, the
lack of such an interaction effect might not be terribly informative,
given that the present research may have possessed insufficient
power to obtain this three-way interaction. Indeed, a great deal of
statistical power would have been needed to test this interaction,
given the paucity of participants who sat alone in the high mor-
tality salience conditions. In light of these considerations, it seems
important to control more thoroughly for the personal relevance of
the particular cultural worldviews that were studied in opposition
to participants’ affiliation defenses. Experiment 2 was specifically
designed for this purpose.
Experiment 2
Experiment 1 shows some strong initial evidence for the emer-
gence of affiliation defenses, but the evidence for worldview
validation defenses is relatively weak. As such, the obtained find-
ings are at odds with prior TMT research, which has found
consistent evidence for the potency of worldview validation de-
fenses (Greenberg et al., 1997). One conspicuous difference be-
tween the present research and prior TMT research lies in the
specific worldviews investigated. In Experiment 1, we operation-
alized worldview defense as the willingness to defend the Dutch
cultural value of tolerance. By contrast, most TMT research has
demonstrated that people become more narrow minded when they
are confronted with existential concerns (see Greenberg et al.,
1997). Moreover, experimental evidence that this tendency can be
moderated by personal adherence to tolerant values is rather lim-
ited (Greenberg et al., 1992). Accordingly, there could be some-
thing about tolerance that renders it less suitable as a terror
management device. If this is correct, Experiment 1 might have
stacked the deck against worldview validation defenses by focus-
ing exclusively on the defense of tolerant worldviews.
The primary goal of Experiment 2 is to come up with a more
potent method of ensuring that participants were highly motivated
to defend the worldviews that were being threatened by their
group. To accomplish this, we first conducted a pretesting session
in which we screened which worldviews were most important to
each participant. After this, we adapted our materials and proce-
dures for a follow-up session to participants’ idiosyncratic world-
views. Accordingly, each participant’s personally most important
worldviews were the focus of the actual experiment. We hoped
that this paradigm, combined with the seating distance methodol-
ogy from Experiment 1, would make for a more powerful way of
gauging the relative importance of affiliation and worldview val-
idation defenses.
Method
Participants and design. Eighty-eight undergraduate students from the
University of Nijmegen (64 women and 24 men; average age  21) were
randomly assigned to a 2 (mortality salience: high vs. low)  2 (group
views: like minded vs. different minded) between-subjects factorial design.
Participants received Dfl. 10 (about $4) for their participation.
Procedure and materials. Two weeks prior to the experiment, partic-
ipants were recruited for a pretesting session. The researchers explained to
the participants that the pretesting was necessary for the second part of the
study and that they would only receive payment if they completed both
sessions.
During the pretesting session, participants filled out a Dutch translation
of the Study of Values (AVL) Scale (Allport, Vernon, & Lindzey, 1960;
see Koole et al., 1999). The AVL Scale is concerned with people’s values
in six major life domains: aesthetics (appreciation of the fine arts and
literature), social (interest in caring for others and human rights), political
(interest in power and influence in society), religion (interest in theology
and church matters), economics (interest in business and finances), and
science (interest in scientific theory and research). The AVL Scale assesses
the relative importance of these six values by asking people to choose
between options that pit two different values against each other. An
example item is “Who contributed the most to the improvement of human-
ity? a) Sir Isaac Newton, or b) Martin Luther King?” A choice of Option
a is scored as a relative preference for the value of science, whereas a
choice of Option b is scored as a relative preference for social values.
Across the 30 items of the AVL Scale, we tested each of the different value
combinations twice. We determined the importance of each value by
counting the number of times it was preferred over one of the other values.
For each participant, the highest scoring value was taken to be the most
important aspect of her or his worldview.
During the experimental session, held about 2 weeks later, participants
were once again welcomed by the experimenter (who was unaware of the
experimental conditions) and escorted to one of the cubicles. As in Exper-
Table 2
Pro-Netherlands Bias as a Function of Mortality Salience and
Seating Position (Experiment 1)
Mortality salience
Seating position
Single chair Clustered chair
Low
M 0.86 2.22
SD 1.46 1.71
n 20 17
High
M 2.00 1.10
SD 1.85 1.92
n 7 28
Note. N  72.
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iment 1, the experimenter explained that a short group discussion was part
of the research and pointed out where the discussion was to take place. All
the remaining instructions were administered through the computer screen.
Participants were informed that they would fill out some questionnaires,
followed by a short group discussion. Participants then answered some
filler personality questionnaires, followed by the mortality salience manip-
ulation and the PANAS, as in Experiment 1. After this, participants were
reminded of the questionnaire that they had filled out 2 weeks before. They
were told that this questionnaire had assessed how much six different
values meant to them: economy, religion, science, social involvement, arts,
and politics. Moreover, participants were informed that the experimenter
had determined which one of these values was most important to each
participant. Following this, participants in the similar-minded group con-
dition read, “For the upcoming group discussion, you have been assigned
to a group of students who value exactly the same category as you.”
Participants in the different-minded group condition read, “For the upcom-
ing group discussion, you have been assigned to a group of students who
place a negative value on your category.” Subsequently, all participants
were instructed to go to the discussion room and wait for the other group
members. As in Experiment 1, we scheduled the experiment such that
participants could not run into each other or actually meet in the discussion
room. Also as in Experiment 1, the discussion room was furnished with a
table with a big-armed chair on the far end, a single chair on one side, and
three clustered chairs on the other side. Participants’ seating preferences
were again covertly scored by the experimenter.
While the participants were waiting for the other group members, they
filled out a number of questionnaires that were constructed to assess
worldview defense. In these questionnaires, participants were asked to
answer some questions regarding two brief essays. One of these two essays
always argued in favor of a particular value that was taken from the AVL
Scale. Six different versions of this essay were used, one corresponding to
each value of the AVL Scale. For instance, the proscience essay read as
follows:
Many people seem to underestimate the importance of science. In my
opinion, science forms the basis of human civilization. Indeed, science
must be the most fundamental thing that distinguishes between hu-
mans and other animal species. For example, if you look at the past,
you will see that science has determined the level of development of
every civilization. A culture without science is unthinkable and
doomed to be lost in oblivion. For me personally, science gives
meaning to my life and allows me to develop my personality.
For each of the other five versions of the value-supportive essay, the
word science was substituted by a different value of the AVL Scale (art,
economy, social commitment, ethics, or religion). Each participant re-
ceived the version of the value-supportive essay that corresponded to her or
his most important value, as assessed by her or his AVL Scale scores
during the pretesting session. The other essay was the same for all partic-
ipants and argued against all forms of cultural meaning. Specifically, the
value-threatening essay argued,
Economy, art, politics, science, all of these amount to the same thing.
Everything is just religion, and religion is a human illusion that we
need in order to escape our anxiety. We simply cannot deal with the
fact that we are nothing more than animals. Eating, drinking, and
putting babies on this world, that’s what it’s all about, the rest is
foolishness and only leads to misery. People should accept the fact
that everything is absolutely meaningless.
Each essay was followed by a series of questions about participants’
evaluations of the author. Five of these questions were based on the IJS
(Byrne, 1971); the two remaining questions were concerned with partici-
pants’ global evaluations of the essay (see Greenberg, Pyszczynski,
Solomon, et al., 1990): “To what extent does this essay appeal to you?” and
“Does this essay affect you in a positive or negative manner?” Both
questions were scored on 9-point scales (1  not at all, 9  very much; or
1  very negative, 9  very positive). After participants had evaluated the
authors of both essays, the experimenter entered the discussion room and
announced that the group discussion was cancelled. Finally, participants
were carefully probed for suspicion, debriefed, paid, and dismissed.
Results
Manipulation check. During the debriefing, almost all partic-
ipants (91.0%) correctly recalled with which other participants
(i.e., similar-minded or different-minded) they were to have a
group discussion. Eight participants (9.0%) who expressed uncer-
tainty regarding this issue were excluded from the analyses below.
Self-reported affect. A 2 (mortality salience: high vs. low) 2
(group values: same as vs. different from self) MANOVA was
conducted on both subscales of the PANAS. The multivariate tests
revealed no significant results. However, a between-subjects
ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for group values on
positive mood, F(1, 76)  4.28, p  .05 (d  .058). This effect
indicated that participants experienced more positive feelings
when they expected to hold a discussion with a similar-minded
group than when they expected to hold a discussion with a
different-minded group (M  3.02, SD  0.65 vs. M  2.71,
SD 0.63 respectively). No significant effects regarding mortality
salience were found ( ps  .5). Moreover, repeating the analyses
reported below with mood as a covariate did not alter any of the
results.
Seating position. Participants’ seating positions were sub-
jected to a 2 (mortality salience: high vs. low)  2 (group values:
same as vs. different from self)  2 (seating position: single chair
vs. clustered chair) logistic regression analysis. This analysis re-
vealed a significant Seating Position  Mortality Salience inter-
action effect, 2(1, N  80)  4.29, p  .04. As Table 3 shows,
most of the participants (70.0%; n  28) in the high mortality
salience condition chose to sit in one of the clustered chairs. In
contrast, less than half of the participants (48.0%; n  19) in the
control condition preferred one of the clustered chairs over the
single chair. In addition, the analysis yielded a significant interac-
tion between seating position and the group values manipulation,
2(1, N  80)  5.93, p  .02. The participants who expected to
meet with different-minded discussants showed a much greater
preference for the clustered chairs (73.0%; n  27) than did the
participants who expected to meet with similar-minded discussants
(46.0%; n  20). Finally, as in Experiment 1, the three-way
interaction among seating position, mortality salience, and group
values was nonsignificant (2  1.00).
Table 3
Seating Preference as a Function of Mortality Salience
(Experiment 2)
Mortality salience
Preferred seat
Single chair Clustered chair
n % n %
Low 21 52 19 48
High 12 30 28 70
Note. N  80.
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Worldview defense. In a preliminary factor analysis, the five
IJS items and the two essay evaluation questions were found to
load on a single factor (loadings  .60). Accordingly, we appro-
priately scored and averaged these items into a single index (Cron-
bach’s   .83). Next, we constructed a composite measure by
subtracting mean evaluations of the value-threatening essay from
mean evaluations of the value-supporting essay. Higher means on
this index indicate greater worldview defense.
As in Experiment 1, we initially included participants’ seating
position as a correlational factor in the analysis of worldview
defense. However, because this analysis revealed no significant
effects involving seating position, seating position was removed
from the analysis.3 Accordingly, we proceeded to analyze the
worldview defense index by means of a 2 (mortality salience: high
vs. low)  2 (group values: same as vs. different from self )
between-subjects ANOVA. As shown in Table 4, this analysis
yielded a Mortality Salience  Group Values interaction, F(1,
76)  5.19, p  .03 (d  .064). Specifically, under high mortality
salience, participants displayed more worldview defense when
they expected to meet a different-minded group than when they
expected to meet a similar-minded group (M  2.71, SD  1.96
vs. M  1.49, SD  2.12, respectively). By contrast, in the neutral
condition, participants displayed somewhat less worldview de-
fense when they expected to meet a different-minded group than
when they expected to meet a similar-minded group (M  1.68,
SD  1.82 vs. M  2.60, SD  2.35, respectively). Separate tests
revealed that the effect of group values was marginally significant
under high mortality salience, F(1, 38) 3.51, p .07 (d .085),
but nonsignificant in the control condition, F(1, 38)  1.38, p 
.16 (d .046). Consequently, the interaction was mainly driven by
the effect of group values in the high mortality salience condition.
Discussion
Given the rather weak emergence of worldview validation de-
fenses in Experiment 1, in Experiment 2 we made a concentrated
effort to ensure participants’ motivation to defend their cultural
worldviews. Specifically, participants were given the choice to
affiliate or not with a group that either validated or threatened a
major life value that the participants had rated as being uniquely
important to them. In spite of these precautions, the effects of
mortality salience on affiliation were again unqualified by the
values that were supported by the group. Mortality salience simply
led to a greater preference to sit down in the group, regardless of
whether the group supported participants’ personal values. There-
fore, Experiment 2 provides a further indication that affiliation
defenses may take precedence over worldview validation defenses
in coping with existential threat.
It is notable that participants did show evidence of being sys-
tematically affected by the group values manipulation. First, par-
ticipants who expected to meet with a different-minded group
reported being in a less favorable mood than did participants who
expected to meet with a similar-minded group. Second, partici-
pants who expected to meet with a different-minded group showed
a greater preference for sitting down in the group than did partic-
ipants who expected to meet a similar-minded group. It is con-
ceivable that these participants sought to avoid a direct confron-
tation with a different-minded group (which, we presume, was
experienced as more threatening) by choosing to sit down among
this group. Conversely, participants may have felt more at ease by
the prospect of interacting with a similar-minded group and were
therefore more comfortable with the notion of sitting alone. Con-
sistent with the latter interpretation, mortality salience elicited
more worldview defense on our paper-and-pencil measure in the
different-minded group condition than in the similar-minded group
condition. It is conceivable that the prospect of being in a similar-
minded group served to alleviate some of the participants’ exis-
tential concerns and thereby rendered further worldview defense
unnecessary. Regardless of which interpretation is more accurate,
both interpretations suggest that our manipulation of group values
was powerful enough to elicit significant changes in participants’
seating behavior. Moreover, the obtained findings confirm the
validity of the seating paradigm as a sensitive measure of affilia-
tion defenses.
It is interesting that the results on our paper-and-pencil measure
of worldview defense were not qualified by participants’ self-
chosen seating position, as they had been in Experiment 1. The
worldview threat manipulation might have had more impact in
Experiment 2, so that affiliation defenses were less able to substi-
tute for worldview validation defenses. Alternatively, our design
might have succeeded in ruling out the influence of individual
differences in the importance of the worldviews that were being
threatened. Methodologically, both of these interpretations imply
that our efforts to provide a more powerful operationalization of
worldview defense were at least somewhat successful. From a
theoretical point of view, the findings of Experiment 2 are consis-
tent with a functional dissociation between affiliation and world-
view validation defenses, as both defenses appeared to operate
simultaneously without canceling each other out. Although this
possibility seems intriguing, the findings of Experiment 2 still
seem open to alternative explanation. Experiment 3 was carried out
to resolve some remaining ambiguities.
Experiment 3
If participants were willing to defend their own worldviews
even when they chose to sit within a worldview-threatening group,
3 When seating position was included as a factor in the ANOVA, this
analysis yielded a Mortality Salience  Group Values interaction, F(1,
72)  5.19, p  .0151 (d  .086). Thus, the statistical reliability of our
findings only became stronger when seating position was taken into
account.
Table 4
Proworldview Bias as a Function of Mortality Salience and
Group Values (Experiment 2)
Mortality salience
In-group view
Different minded Similar minded
Low
M 1.68 2.60
SD 1.82 2.35
High
M 2.71 1.49
SD 1.96 2.12
Note. N  80.
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then what does participants’ seating preference tell us about the
relative strength of affiliation and worldview validation defenses?
As we have argued before, it seems plausible that participants’
seating preference was driven by unconscious affiliation mecha-
nisms that operated somewhat independently of worldview vali-
dation defenses. However, it could also be that participants chose
to sit within the worldview-threatening group because they wanted
to persuade this group of skeptics of the correctness of their own
beliefs. From the latter perspective, participants’ affiliations with
worldview-threatening groups could be reinterpreted as a more
vigorous pursuit of worldview validation concerns or a kind of
defensive zeal (I. McGregor, Zanna, Holmes & Spencer, 2001). If
this were indeed the case, our findings in Experiments 1 and 2
would once again be squarely in support of the primacy of world-
view validation, as TMT has advocated.
To clarify these alternative interpretations, we designed a final
experiment that provides an even more explicit confrontation
between affiliation and worldview validation defenses. Specifi-
cally, we presented participants literally with the dilemma of
choosing between either sitting alone and defending their own
worldviews or sitting in the group and attacking their own world-
views. If, consistent with TMT, participants’ desire to sit within
the group is motivated by concerns with worldview validation,
then mortality salience should produce in participants a greater
preference for defending their own worldviews, even if this means
sitting alone. Alternatively, if participants’ seating preference is
motivated by affiliation strivings, then mortality salience should
yield a greater preference for sitting in the group, even when this
means that participants have to turn their back on their own
worldviews.
Method
Participants and design. Sixty undergraduate students from the Free
University Amsterdam (42 women and 18 men; average age  22) were
randomly assigned to the high or low mortality salience conditions. Par-
ticipants received Dfl. 7.5 (about $3) for their participation.
Procedure and materials. On arrival in the laboratory, participants
were greeted by an experimenter (who was unaware of the experimental
conditions) and led to separate cubicles, each containing an Apple Macin-
tosh computer. The remaining instructions were administered through the
computer screen. It was first explained that the research consisted of a
number of separate studies. Participants then moved on to the first study,
which was similar to the first part of Experiments 1 and 2. Participants
answered some filler personality questionnaires, followed by the mortality
salience manipulation and the PANAS.
Participants continued with the second study, which was described as an
investigation of discussion methods. Supposedly as part of this investiga-
tion, they would partake in a group discussion with a minimum of three and
a maximum of eight discussants. This group discussion was to take place
in a separate discussion room at the end of the session. During the group
discussion, each discussant would be requested to defend a worldview that
was either congruent or incongruent with her or his personal worldviews.
Furthermore, it was explained that the researchers were interested in
studying the influence of the number of discussants and their seating
positions. Accordingly, the computer would randomly determine the num-
ber of discussants for the group discussion, the arrangements of the seats,
and which worldviews have to be defended for each of the different seats.
As a result of this, when participants chose a particular seat, they would be
required to defend a particular opinion that was either congruent or incon-
gruent with their own worldviews. To reduce self-presentation concerns,
we stressed that the researchers were not interested in participants’ seating
decisions or their worldviews but rather in studying how well the discus-
sants would listen to the arguments given by the different group members.
To familiarize participants with the procedures, we gave them a few
examples.
For each example, the computer screen showed a two-dimensional
diagram of a rectangular table and chairs as viewed from above. Each
diagram was presented with two options that required participants to
defend an opinion that was either at odds or in line with their worldview.
In Example 1, the diagram depicted three chairs that were placed at one
long side of the table and that were labeled from 1 to 3, one chair that was
placed at the other long side of the table and that was labeled 4, and one
chair that was placed at the short side of the table and that was labeled 5.
Option 1 was, “You can defend an opinion in line with your own world-
view in: chair 2, chair 3, chair 5.” Thus if participants chose Option 1, they
would be required to defend an opinion in line with their own worldview.
Option 2 was, “You can defend an opinion that is at odds with your own
worldview in: chair 1, and chair 4.” Thus, Option 2 required participants to
defend an opinion that was at odds with their own worldview. Therefore,
both options of Example 1 allowed participants to sit next to the other
group members. In Example 2, the diagram depicted three chairs that were
placed in a cluster on one of the short ends of the table and that were
labeled 1 to 3, and one chair that was placed on the opposite side of the
table and that was labeled 4. Option 1 was, “You can defend an opinion in
line with your own worldview in: chair 1, chair 2, chair 3.” Thus, Option 1
required participants to defend an opinion in line with their own worldview
and sit next to the other participants. Option 2 was, “You can defend an
opinion that is at odds with your own worldview in: chair 4.” So, by
contrast, Option 2 required participants to defend an opinion that was at
odds with their own worldview and to sit alone. It should be noted that for
both example presentations, sitting in the group could be combined with
defending one’s own worldviews. The example presentations thus avoided
any conflict between affiliation and worldview validation.
Following the two example presentations, participants were told that the
computer was about to make contact with the server to generate the actual
seating arrangement. An hourglass appeared on the screen for 7 s, after
which the final table diagram was displayed. This diagram depicted three
clustered chairs on one long side of the table, labeled 1 to 3, and a single
chair on the other long side of the table, labeled 4. As in the example
presentations, participants were able to choose between two options. Op-
tion 1 was, “You can defend an opinion in line with your own worldview
in: chair 4.” Thus, Option 1 required participants to defend an opinion that
was in line with their own worldviews and to sit alone (the single chair).
Option 2 was, “You can defend an opinion that is at odds with your own
worldview in: chair 1, chair 2, chair 3.” As opposed to Option 1, Option 2
required participants to defend an opinion that was at odds with their own
worldviews and sit among others (one of the clustered chairs). Thus, this
decision involved the critical dilemma between affiliation and worldview
validation. As before, participants indicated their decision by typing their
response into the computer. After stating their preferred seating position,
participants moved on to an unrelated investigation. Finally, the partici-
pants were probed for suspicion, extensively debriefed, paid, and
dismissed.
Results
Manipulation check. During the debriefing, 96.6% of the par-
ticipants indicated no suspicions regarding the goals or content of
the experiment. The data from 2 participants (1 in each experi-
mental condition) were removed from the data set because these
participants had indicated suspicion about the experimental proce-
dures during the debriefing
Self-reported affect. A one-way (mortality salience: high vs.
low) ANOVA was conducted on the two subscales of the PANAS.
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As in Experiment 1, this analysis revealed no significant results
(both ps  .7).
Nonbinding seating decisions. Although participants’ deci-
sions during the example items were explicitly presented as non-
binding, they might still be revealing of participants’ readiness to
defend their own worldviews. Indeed, prior TMT research sug-
gests that worldview validation defenses may even emerge for
activities that represent no more than a symbolic value to the actors
(Greenberg et al., 1995).
Recall that both seating alternatives in Example 1 offered the
prospect of being seated next to some of the other discussants.
Thus, choosing between the two alternatives primarily involved a
decision between a seating position that required participants to
defend their own worldviews versus a seating position that re-
quired participants to attack their own worldviews. Across the
experimental conditions, a majority of the participants (74.0%)
indicated a preference for the seating alternative that allowed them
to defend their own worldviews. Inspection of the frequencies of
participants’ decisions indicated that the preference for the
worldview-congruent seating alternative was somewhat more pro-
nounced in the high mortality salience condition relative to the low
mortality salience condition (83.0% vs. 66.0%, respectively).
However, a 2 (mortality salience: high vs. low)  2 (seating
alternative: worldview congruent vs. worldview incongruent) lo-
gistic regression analysis failed to show a significant Mortality
Salience  Seating Alternative effect, 2(1, N  58)  2.28, p 
.15. Possibly, this nonsignificant result was due to a ceiling effect,
given that a majority of the participants in the low mortality
salience condition already showed a preference for the worldview-
congruent alternative.
Recall that Example 2 consisted of a choice between a seating
position that offered the opportunity for both worldview validation
and affiliation versus a seating position that offered the opportu-
nity for neither worldview validation or affiliation. Across both
experimental conditions, a majority of the participants (79.0%)
indicated a preference for the seating alternative that required them
to sit in the group and defend their own worldviews. Inspection of
the frequencies of participants’ decisions indicated that the pref-
erence for the worldview-congruent seating alternative was about
equal in the high mortality salience condition relative to the low
mortality salience condition (83.0% vs. 76.0%, respectively). A 2
(mortality salience: high vs. low)  2 (decision alternative: world-
view congruent vs. worldview incongruent) logistic regression
analysis failed to show a significant Mortality Salience Decision
Alternative effect, 2(1, N  58)  0.42, p  .52. As before, this
nonsignificant result could well have been due to a ceiling effect,
given that a majority of the participants in the low mortality
salience condition already showed a preference for the worldview-
congruent alternative that involved sitting in the group.
Actual seating decisions. In making their actual, binding seat-
ing decisions, participants had to choose between (a) sitting alone
and defending an opinion in line with their own worldviews and
(b) sitting in the group and defending an opinion that was at odds
with their own worldviews. We subjected participants’ decisions to
a 2 (mortality salience: high vs. low)  2 (seating alternative:
worldview incongruent/group chair vs. worldview congruent/sin-
gle chair) logistic regression analysis. As shown in Table 5, this
analysis showed a significant interaction effect between mortality
salience and seating alternative, 2(1, N  58)  4.52, p  .04.
Specifically, preference for the worldview-congruent/single-chair
alternative was found to be weaker under high versus low mortal-
ity salience (48.0% vs. 76.0%, respectively).
Another way of describing the results is to examine the number
of individuals who shifted their opinions between the nonbinding
seating decision in Sample Arrangement 2 (which involved no
conflict between affiliation and worldview validation) and the
actual, binding seating decision (which did involve a conflict
between affiliation and worldview validation). As might be ex-
pected, the only shifts that were observed occurred from the
worldview-congruent seating alternative to the worldview-
incongruent seating alternative. Accordingly, we subjected partic-
ipants’ shift intentions to a 2 (mortality salience: high vs. low) 2
(options: shifters vs. nonshifters) logistic regression analysis. This
analysis revealed that heightened mortality salience caused more
participants to shift from the worldview-congruent seat toward the
worldview-incongruent seat, 2(1, N  58)  5.88, p  .015
(54.0% vs. 19.0%, respectively).
Discussion
In Experiment 3, we followed a somewhat different method-
ological strategy in studying the interplay between affiliation and
worldview validation defenses. In our previous two experiments,
our approach had been rather subtle, focusing on participants’
spontaneous tendencies to affiliate with proximal social groups. By
contrast, the approach of Experiment 3 is much more blatant.
Indeed, we explicitly presented participants with the dilemma of
choosing between sitting alone and defending their own world-
views or sitting in the group and attacking their own worldviews.
In spite of this difference in approach, the findings of Experiment 3
are highly consistent with our previous observations. More specif-
ically, Experiment 3 finds once more that mortality salience caused
a greater preference for sitting in the group, even when sitting in
the group required participants to attack their own worldviews. It
thus appears that mortality salience aroused such strong concerns
with affiliation that our participants, at least in the experimental
context, were willing to explicitly turn against their own world-
views to remain affiliated with the group.
As in the previous three experiments, there is reason to believe
that the results of Experiment 3 are not due to a simple lack of
involvement among our participants with their own worldviews.
First, similar to Experiment 2, the procedures were focused on
participants’ personal worldviews, thereby ensuring the personal
Table 5
Seating Preference as a Function of Mortality Salience
(Experiment 3)
Mortality salience
Preferred seat
Worldview
congruent/single
chair
Worldview
incongruent/group
chair
n % n %
Low 22 76 7 24
High 14 48 15 52
Note. N  58.
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relevance of these worldviews. Second, the analysis of partici-
pants’ nonbinding seating decisions revealed that participants
strongly preferred to defend their own worldviews, provided that
doing so did not interfere with their affiliation defenses. Third, the
nonbinding seating decisions presumably served to prime partici-
pants’ own worldviews, thereby rendering these worldviews
highly accessible (cf. Greenberg et al., 1992). In spite of this,
heightened mortality salience caused a greater number of partici-
pants to shift toward a worldview-incongruent seating position that
allowed them to remain affiliated with the group. Taken together,
the results of Experiment 3 suggest that affiliation defenses are
indeed capable of overriding worldview validation defenses, even
when the worldviews in question are personally relevant and
highly accessible.
Attentive readers may have noticed that in Experiment 3, 52.0%
of the participants chose to sit in the group chair, whereas in
Experiments 1 and 2, 80.0% and 70.0%, respectively, chose to do
so. It thus appears that the rate of sitting in the group was
somewhat lower in Experiment 3, as compared with the other two
seating experiments. It is conceivable that this difference was due
to participants’ reluctance to attack their own worldviews, which
was explicitly stated as a consequence of choosing to sit in the
group in Experiment 3. On the other hand, there were a number of
procedural differences between Experiment 3 and Experiments 1
and 2. For instance, the decision to sit in the group was much more
explicit in Experiment 3. Assuming that affiliation defenses are
highly automatic and even, to a large extent, subsymbolic, partic-
ipants’ explicit seating decisions might have been less sensitive to
the operation of affiliation defenses. A second procedural differ-
ence was that participants in Experiment 3 had been asked to state
their seating preferences during a few practice decisions that were
nonbinding. Almost all participants preferred the seating option
that allowed them to defend their own worldviews, which is not
especially surprising, given that these decisions involved no con-
flict between worldview validation and affiliation. Although a
substantial number of participants shifted between these practice
decisions and their actual seating decisions, these practice deci-
sions might have created a motivation among our participants to be
consistent in their decision making and, thus, to choose the seat
that allowed them to defend their own worldviews. In light of these
various procedural differences between Experiment 3 and Exper-
iments 1 and 2, more research is needed to explain why a lower
percentage of participants chose to sit within the group in
Experiment 3.
General Discussion
The present research highlights the importance of affiliation
defenses in the psychological confrontation with death. Across
three different experiments, we found that mortality salience led to
increased affiliation strivings, as indicated by a greater behavioral
tendency to sit next to fellow group members (Experiments 1 and
2) and a more pronounced preference for sitting within the group
as opposed to sitting alone (Experiments 1–3). The tendency to
affiliate with other group members thus emerged as a highly robust
reaction toward death-related thoughts. Mortality salience even led
to increased affiliation when group members had previously
threatened participants’ worldviews (Experiments 1 and 2) or
when affiliation with the group forced participants to attack their
own worldviews (Experiment 3). Therefore, it appears that affili-
ation defenses were powerful enough to override at least some of
participants’ concerns with worldview validation. Because of the
theoretical importance of the interplay between affiliation and
worldview validation defenses, we consider this issue more closely
in the next few paragraphs.
The Interplay Between Affiliation and Worldview
Validation Defenses
In the present research, we followed a two-fold strategy in
addressing the interplay between affiliation and worldview vali-
dation defenses. First, we manipulated the extent to which group
affiliation was threatening to participants’ worldviews and ob-
served how this affected participants’ tendency to affiliate with the
group. Because this strategy allows for an examination of affilia-
tion and worldview validation defenses on a single dependent
variable, this seems the most direct way to examine the interplay
of both defense mechanisms. Remarkably, the results showed that
the increase in affiliation due to mortality salience was not mod-
erated by the degree to which affiliation with the group was at odds
with participants’ worldviews. This lack of moderation effects did
not appear to be due to the weakness of our manipulations of
worldview threat, because we used either worldviews that were
central to the culture of our participants (Experiment 1) or world-
views that were ideographically relevant to our participants indi-
vidually (Experiments 2 and 3). Moreover, our procedures ren-
dered participants’ worldviews highly accessible throughout all
three experiments. Attesting further to the strength of our world-
view manipulations, some of our other findings clearly show that
our participants were prepared to defend their worldviews, al-
though not in an unqualified manner. For instance, participants
displayed a proworldview bias on our essay measure in Experi-
ments 1 and 2. In a similar vein, participants preferred to defend
their own worldviews in Experiment 3 in their nonbinding seating
decisions. Thus, our participants seemed both willing and able to
defend their worldviews, as long as doing so did not interfere with
their affiliation strivings.
Our second strategy for examining the interplay between affil-
iation and worldview validation defenses consisted of administer-
ing conventional essay measures of worldview validation (Green-
berg, Pyszczynski, Solomon, et al., 1990) after participants had
been provided with an opportunity for affiliation. To control for
the earlier operation of affiliation defenses, our analyses of the
essay measures took participants’ prior affiliation status (i.e., their
self-chosen seating position) into account. Overall, this strategy is
inferentially weaker than the first strategy, because it allows for
less experimental control over the extent to which participants had
already buffered themselves by affiliating with the group. Still, the
second strategy might provide some additional insight into the
interplay between affiliation and worldview validation defenses.
Experiment 1 did find increased worldview validation under
heightened mortality salience, but only among participants who
had not affiliated with the group (i.e., those who had chosen to sit
down alone). Finally, the essay measure in Experiment 2 again
showed increased worldview validation under heightened mortal-
ity salience, but this time the effect was unqualified by partici-
pants’ affiliation status.
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Taken together, our findings reveal two broad patterns in the
interplay between affiliation and worldview validation defenses.
First, affiliation defenses seem capable of overriding worldview
validation defenses, especially when the dependent measure di-
rectly assesses affiliation behavior. Indeed, across all three exper-
iments, two different measures of affiliation behavior (i.e., behav-
ioral seating position and self-stated seating preference) revealed
evidence for increased affiliation under high mortality salience,
regardless of whether affiliation supported participants’ own
worldviews. By contrast, the essay measures of worldview vali-
dation appeared to be somewhat less affected by affiliation de-
fenses, especially in Experiment 1. It is conceivable that the essay
measures were less sensitive to the emergence of affiliation de-
fenses, given that these measures were less direct and more laden
with symbolic meanings than our affiliation measures.
With regard to the latter findings, there was an interesting
discrepancy between the findings in Experiments 1 and 2. In
Experiment 1, in which the essay measure was concerned with
culturally valued worldviews, worldview validation defenses were
moderated by participants’ affiliation status. By contrast, in Ex-
periment 2, the essay measure was concerned with participants’
ideographically relevant worldviews, and worldview validation
defenses were not moderated by participants’ affiliation status.
Accordingly, affiliation defenses might be able to override or
compensate for worldview validation defenses when the world-
views in question are valued by the culture at large. When such
culturally valued worldviews are under attack, people might be
able to trivialize or downplay the importance of these worldviews
(cf. Simon, Greenberg, & Brehm, 1995). By contrast, when the
group threatens personally relevant worldviews, people might be
less able to disregard the worldview threat, given that they are
already personally invested in these worldviews. Because Exper-
iments 1 and 2 differ on several dimensions besides the personal
relevance of the worldviews that were threatened, it is possible that
other factors accounted for our results. Therefore, more systematic
research is needed to test whether personal relevance indeed mod-
erates the extent to which affiliation defenses are able to compen-
sate for or override worldview validation defenses.
The Case for Multiple Terror Management Defenses
Even though our empirical analysis of the interplay between
affiliation and worldview validation defenses is only preliminary,
we still offer some speculations about the broader theoretical
implications of our findings. In a recent article, Pyszczynski et al.
(1999) distinguished between two distinct terror management
mechanisms. The first type of mechanism consists of largely
conscious, pseudological denials of one’s vulnerability and the
relevance of death concerns (e.g., “I am still young and healthy, it
will take a while before I die”). The second type of mechanism is
largely unconscious and consists of the defense of broader sym-
bolic meaning structures, such as cultural worldviews, that, on the
surface, bear no logical or rational relationship to the problem of
death but are only distally related to death transcendence.
How do affiliation defenses fit into this conceptual scheme? We
begin by noting that affiliation does not represent a (pseudo)
rational way of denying of one’s own mortality. Moreover, none of
our participants reported during the debriefing that they had con-
sciously attempted to affiliate with their group to escape from their
existential concerns. Thus, affiliation defenses are similar to
TMT’s conceptualization of distal defense, in the sense of being
mediated by implicit, irrational processes. Nevertheless, our find-
ings also indicate that affiliation defenses do not necessarily op-
erate in the service of upholding cultural–symbolic meanings and
may even override the need to defend such meanings. As such,
affiliation defenses only partially fit with TMT’s notion of distal
defenses (Pyszczynski et al., 1999). Instead, the anxiety-buffering
role of affiliation may operate, to a large extent, through subcog-
nitive mechanisms that are independent of socially shared sym-
bolic meanings. Consistent with this, recent psychobiological work
(e.g., Carter et al., 1997; Taylor et al., 2000; Uchino et al., 1996)
suggests that affiliation is capable of reducing anxiety through
neuroendocrine processes. Affiliation defenses are thus qualita-
tively different from both rational and distal defenses, as a form of
defense that relies largely on innate, hard-wired defense systems
that operate in humans as well as other animal species.
The current distinction between symbolic and subsymbolic de-
fenses is much in line with personality systems interactions (PSI)
theory, an integrative personality theory that has recently been
formulated by Kuhl (2001). PSI theory distinguishes between two
forms of implicit functioning, extension memory and intuitive
behavior control. Extension memory is a cognitive system that
consists of extended networks of self-representations and meaning
structures. As such, the functional profile of extension memory
makes it likely that this system mediates worldview validation
defenses of the kind that are proposed by TMT (Pyszczynski et al.,
1999). By contrast, intuitive behavior control is a cognitive system
that mediates automatic, often innately prepared forms of self-
regulation. As such, the functional profile of intuitive behavior
control fits with the highly automatic, subsymbolic ways affiliation
defenses appear to operate. According to PSI theory, the distinc-
tion between extension memory and intuitive behavior control has
a number of profound functional implications. For instance, the
activation of extension memory is somewhat slower than that of
intuitive behavior control (even though both systems are implicit
and automatic), because the activation of extended cognitive net-
works is likely to be more time-consuming than the activation of
simple behavior programs. In addition, extension memory is more
likely to vary among individuals, because extension memory de-
velops largely from experience, whereas large parts of intuitive
behavior control are innate. Applied to the current context, we
might speculate that worldview validation defenses are probably
somewhat slower to emerge and more prone to individual differ-
ences, compared with affiliation defenses. Although the testing of
these hypotheses awaits future research, this type of theorizing
seems likely to add significantly to our understanding of terror
management defenses.
Although we have hitherto stressed the distinction between
worldview validation and affiliation defenses, we by no means
want to argue that the two kinds of defenses never cooperate.
Theoretically, Kuhl (2001) has argued that extension memory and
intuitive behavior control (i.e., the cognitive systems that may
underlie worldview validation and affiliation defenses) are func-
tionally compatible and often highly interconnected. In line with
this, most cultures stress the importance of interpersonal relation-
ships, such as friendship and romantic love (Baumeister & Leary,
1995; Taubman Ben-Ari et al., 2002; Goldenberg, Pyszczynski,
Greenberg, & Solomon, 2000). Moreover, from a developmental
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perspective, symbolic defenses may evolve from relatively prim-
itive associations between valued behavior and safety and protec-
tion that are provided by the primary caregivers (Pyszczynski et
al., 1999). As the child’s cognitive capacities continue to develop,
symbolic defenses may gradually acquire a functional indepen-
dence from the protection that is offered by the primary caregivers.
For instance, the comfort that is derived from a father’s physical
presence might be complemented by the comfort of having a more
abstract father figure who resides in heaven and watches over one
when one is alone. Although this account of the interrelationship
between worldview validation and affiliation defenses is admit-
tedly crude and speculative, it seems clear that both types of
defenses are not only distinct but also mutually related.
Limitations and Future Perspectives
Before closing, we mention some limitations of the current
research as well as some challenges for future research. First, we
emphasize that the present studies were explicitly aimed at sepa-
rating the anxiety-buffering influence of subsymbolic affiliation
behaviors from the anxiety-buffering influence of intrinsically
symbolic behaviors such as worldview validation. Although we
believe that the distinction between these two defenses is useful on
a theoretical level, it is probably most common for affiliation and
worldview validation defenses to operate in tandem. In real life
situations, people’s closest in-group members are likely to share
their attitudes, ideologies, and religious beliefs. Consequently,
affiliation and worldview validation defenses probably work to-
gether most of the time to shield people’s minds from existential
concerns. Even so, people may sometimes be confronted with the
pressing dilemma of choosing between their personal beliefs and
affiliation with the group. For instance, dissidents of all persua-
sions and nationalities have faced the decision between remaining
safe within the silent majority or standing up for their beliefs and
facing the potential wrath of the authorities. Closer to home,
dissenting communicators often feel pressured to shift their atti-
tudes toward the position of the audience (Lerner & Tetlock,
1999), and individuals holding egalitarian beliefs are made to feel
like narrow-minded prudes when they speak out against a sexist
joke (Ford, 2000). Studying the range of situations in which
affiliation and worldview validation defenses may be in conflict or
mutually reinforce each other seems an important agenda for
future research.
Second, the present research studies affiliation as a unitary form
of defense. Although this strategy is convenient for the present
purposes, it might be possible to analyze affiliation defenses into
further component processes. For instance, it might be possible to
distinguish approach- and avoidance-oriented affiliation defenses.
Approach affiliation defenses may be directed toward obtaining
the positive social outcomes that are associated with being part of
the group, whereas avoidance affiliation defenses may be focused
on avoiding the negative social outcomes that are associated with
being alone (Frank & Brandstaetter, 2002; see also Higgins, 1998).
The present paradigm did not allow us to discriminate between
approach- and avoidance-oriented affiliation defenses, but recent
research in our laboratory suggests that it may be useful to make
this distinction (Wisman & Koole, 2001). Third, the present ex-
periments only compare mortality salience conditions with neutral
control conditions. As such, it remains possible that the observed
affiliation defenses qualities are not unique to terror management
processes. Indeed, past affiliation research suggests that this form
of defensive occurs under a wide variety of anxiety-provoking
events (Schachter, 1959; Taylor et al., 2000). As such, it may well
be that affiliation defenses are triggered by a wider variety of
threats than worldview validation defenses, which have been
shown to occur predominantly in response to death-related threats
(Greenberg et al., 1997). Examining the specificity of the present
findings to terror management processes thus constitutes an im-
portant issue for future research.
Concluding Remarks
The psychological confrontation with death is undoubtedly one
of the most terrifying problems that each individual must face.
Because of the sheer magnitude of this problem, people need to
rely on psychological defenses to shield themselves from existen-
tial anxiety. In the present research, we have shown that affiliation
with other group members qualifies as an especially powerful
terror management defense. When people are reminded of their
existential concerns, it suddenly becomes especially important to
them to be close to other group members. It is notable that this
affiliation defense even emerges when other group members
threaten one’s own worldviews. When plagued by existential con-
cerns, people simply want to hide in the crowd, no matter what
ideas this crowd has espoused.
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